EGALCHAIN · THE RULES OF YOUR MONEY · WHO STEERS THEM

The rules of your money are yours to steer.

A protocol has settings that decide how your money behaves — what a loan costs, what a transfer is taxed, how the network's earnings are shared. You, together with the others who use it, can change them.

A setting is one dial the protocol reads to decide how it treats your money. It has a value today, a floor and a ceiling the code refuses to cross, and a list of who is allowed to vote on it. Nothing more mysterious than that. There are more than a hundred of them, and this page walks through what they do and how you change one.

A normal bank changes its rules in a room you will never enter, decided by people who do not pay the price when it goes wrong. Here the rules sit in the open, and the people who use the money decide them — by a vote, on a schedule, with limits the code enforces. That includes deciding against what I would have chosen. I built it that way on purpose, and I am not going to pretend it costs nothing.

Because it does. A dial here is connected to a real person's loan, a real person's savings. So this page does two things: it shows you exactly how a change happens, and it shows you how to weigh one before you push it. You can move these. The cost of moving one badly lands on someone else.

Current block
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Network
Test network
Settings you can vote on
111
Out of every vote's reach
5% humanitarian + 10% shared dividend

What you'll find here.

  1. 01 A setting is a lever on real people
  2. 02 How a change actually happens
  3. 03 Ask the others first
  4. 04 The four deepest rules
  5. 05 The settings, group by group
  6. 06 Honestly, where this stands
  7. 07 Your part
01 · The weight of it

A setting is a lever on real people.

Every dial on this page is wired to someone's money. That is easy to forget when you are looking at a number with a floor and a ceiling — it reads like a thermostat. It is not. Pull a lever and the effect does not always show up at the vote. It shows up weeks later, on the people who never saw it coming, when it is hard to undo.

Take the collateral a borrower has to put up. Lower it, and you are being generous — more people can borrow, with less to pledge. But lower it too far and more of those loans go unpaid, and the unpaid loans come out of the safety fund, the shared cushion that pays out when a loan defaults. So the dial you loosened to help borrowers drains the fund the next borrower is counting on. The move that helped the first borrower is the move that emptied the fund for the next one.

Or take the tax on converting your everyday money back to the reserve asset — the brake that slows a panic so a rush for the exit cannot drain the system in an afternoon. Useful, up to a point. Push its ceiling too high and you are no longer slowing a panic. You are trapping the savings of someone whose national currency is collapsing and who is trying to get their money out before it is worth nothing. The lever meant to hold a run together becomes a wall around their money. That is why it has a ceiling the code will not let a vote cross.

So the sound way to approach a proposal is plain: know what the lever actually does, who it touches, and why its floor and ceiling sit where they do — those bounds are usually a scar from a failure someone already lived through. A change made fast, or pushed to an extreme, can hurt the very people it was meant to serve.

Holding the direction means holding the weight of it — and the weight does not arrive at the vote, it arrives later, on someone who was not in the room.

02 · How a change happens

How a change actually happens.

A change to a setting is slow on purpose, and built to be hard to slip past people. Here is the whole path, in order.

First, anyone with a verified identity proposes a change to one setting — a single dial, to a value inside its allowed range. One proposal, one dial.

Then every verified miner votes, for about thirty days. There is no rush and no surprise close: the window is long enough that a change cannot slip past while people are not looking.

It passes only if enough people show up and enough of them agree: at least 30% of miners must take part, and at least half of those who vote must say yes. An exact tie passes. If either bar is missed, the change does not happen.

The vote is weighed by the square root of your shares, not by your shares directly. In plain terms: to count for twice as much, you need four times the mining; to count for three times as much, nine times. Influence climbs far more slowly than raw power, so the largest farm cannot drown out a small voter, and a small cooperative keeps a real voice.

If it passes, two of three independent keyholders co-sign it — a final check no single hand can apply alone. Then it takes effect after a delay of roughly three days, and it stays reversible the whole time the delay runs.

Four rules go deeper than the rest, and changing one of them takes a higher bar: three-quarters of votes must say yes, at least half of miners must take part, all three of those keyholders must sign, and the delay is about thirty days — reversible while it runs. Those four are named in their own section below.

And two things no vote can ever touch, at any majority, on any path: the 10% shared dividend, and the 5% humanitarian share. Those are the floor of your protection. The catalogue that follows changes nothing about them.

One last thing worth knowing before the catalogue: it is not only miners who vote. A committed saver, once their locked savings clear a certain bar, earns the right to vote on the same footing — so an everyday ES holder is part of this too. That bar is itself one of the settings, explained in the catalogue.

To be exactTwo different sets of keys exist, and they must not be confused. The co-signing on a rule change is two of three independent keyholders — and a change to one of the four deepest rules needs all three of those same three. That is the only keyset this page is about. A completely separate set of keys — three of five regulators — guards settlement between outside institutions. That is a different mechanism for a different job, and it is not the subject of this page. The governance co-signers are never "three of five," and the keyholders who guard a rule change are not the ones who guard settlement.
03 · Before you propose

Before you propose, ask the people it would touch.

Before you propose a change — or while you are still deciding whether to — you can put the question to the people it would affect. The protocol gives you two ways to do it, and neither is a formality.

The first is a world poll: a permanent, anonymous, country-level record of opinion. You ask plainly — "should we change this?" — and people answer. The record carries the country an answer came from, never the name behind it. It does not itself change any rule. It is not a vote and it does not bind anyone. It shows you where the community actually stands, country by country, before you ask them to commit to anything.

The second is a witness: a timestamped record that cannot be erased. You use it to set down the case for your change — the reasoning, the evidence, why it matters — so that later, when people argue about it, no one can deny the case was made or quietly rewrite it. One honest limit: the record's anchor is permanent and unerasable, but the file it points to lives elsewhere, and if no one keeps hosting it, the file itself can become unreachable. What survives is the proof that you set it down, on that date.

Why do this at all, when nothing requires it. A setting touches everyone who uses the money, so a change the community has actually weighed is sounder than one decided alone. Open the question and someone affected will tell you what you missed. And a change reasoned in the open is harder to wave away later than one that slipped through quietly.

So asking first is not required. It is the wiser path, and the protocol is built to let you take it.

04 · The deepest rules

The four deepest rules, and the two no one can touch.

Four settings are not in the catalogue below, because they are not ordinary dials. They are the bedrock — the backing of the money and the split of every coin — and changing one of them takes the hardest path the protocol has.

In plain words, the four are: the rate at which the reserve asset (EGL) converts into everyday money (ES); the reserve cover required behind lending — how much ES a loan is allowed to create against the reserve held behind it; the finder's share of each block — the 33% kept by whoever mines it; and the community share — the 52% that funds cooperative credit and the shared pots. Move any of these carelessly and the whole structure shifts under everyone at once.

That is why the bar is higher. On these four, the vote changes character: it is one miner, one voice — no square-root weighting, no advantage to a big farm. Then three-quarters must say yes, at least half must take part, all three keyholders must sign, and the change waits about thirty days before it bites, reversible the whole time. They are the spine the rest of the protocol hangs on, so you do not get to move them on a whim.

And below even those four sits a harder floor still. The four deepest rules are movable — only on the hardest path, but movable. The 10% shared dividend and the 5% humanitarian share are movable by no vote, at any majority, ever. No path on this page reaches them. That is the part of your protection that no count of votes can take.

To be exact"Out of the vote's reach" is exact, but it is not absolute. The deepest rules could still shift through a coordinated, open upgrade of the entire network — a visible, costly public departure that everyone can see, never a number moved in silence. I will not claim "no fork can change this." I will claim this: no vote can, and no quiet move can.
05 · The settings

The settings, group by group.

Here are the 111 settings the community can vote on, grouped by what they govern in your life. Each one shows its plain-language name, what it does to your money, its value today and the range it is allowed to move in as plain numbers, and who can vote on it. Under each, in small print, is the exact name it carries in the code, for anyone who wants to check it against the source. Everywhere below, "who can vote" means the same thing: every verified miner, and any committed saver above the voting-stake bar, on the same footing.

A · What a loan costs you

What a loan costs, and how much you can borrow.

The dials behind a cooperative loan: what you pay in interest, how large a loan you can take, how much security you must put up, and how all of it eases as you build a record of repaying. The protocol rewards a borrower who pays back — interest falls, required security falls, borrowing room grows.

  • Base interest rate
    The starting interest rate on a cooperative loan, before any discount you have earned.Today around 8% · can move between 0.5% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: interest_base_permille
  • Discount per credit level
    How much your interest drops for each level of repayment history you build, so a proven borrower pays less.Can move between 0% and 10% off per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: interest_score_discount_dpermille
  • Active-miner discount
    An extra cut on your interest if you also help run the network by mining.Can move between 0% and 10% off.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: interest_miner_discount_dpermille
  • Lowest possible rate
    The floor your interest can never fall below, however much history you have built.Can move between 0% and 10%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: interest_min_permille
  • Minimum loan interest
    A floor on the interest of a loan as a share of the quoted total, so credit cannot become almost free by borrowing and repaying in the same instant.Today 10% of the quote · can move between 5% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: loan_min_interest_permille
  • Rate sensitivity to demand
    How sharply the rate climbs when a lot of the lending capacity is already in use, cooling demand when credit is tight.A scaling dial, set between 0 and 3,000 (higher means it reacts harder).Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: dynamic_rate_sensitivity
  • Borrowing power, baseline
    How much you can borrow as a multiple of your standing, before you have built any history.Can move between 0.1× and 2.0×.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: loan_mult_base
  • Borrowing power growth
    How much your borrowing room grows with each level of repayment history.A growth dial, set between 0.5 and 5.0 per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: loan_mult_slope_deci
  • Smallest first loan
    The smallest amount a brand-new borrower with no history can take.Can move between 10 ES and 1,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: loan_min_base_es
  • Smallest-loan growth
    How much the smallest amount you can borrow rises with each level of history.Can move between 0 ES and 500 ES per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: loan_min_growth_es
  • Largest first loan
    The largest amount a brand-new borrower with no history can take.Can move between 100 ES and 5,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: loan_max_base_es
  • Largest-loan growth
    How much the largest amount you can borrow rises with each level of history.Can move between 100 ES and 5,000 ES per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: loan_max_growth_es
  • Trust-built collateral waiver
    The level of cumulated repaid interest above which a borrower can take a loan with no security pledged at all.Can move between 10% and 90%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: coverage_threshold_permille
  • Collateral at the start
    How much security a brand-new borrower must pledge against a loan, before any history lowers it.Can move between 0% and 50% of the loan.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: vault_base_permille
  • Collateral relief per level
    How much the required security drops for each level of repayment history, down to none for a proven borrower.Can move between 0% and 10% off per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: vault_discount_per_score
  • Auto-repayment at the start
    The share of your block earnings the protocol quietly skims to pay down your loan on its own, for a borrower with no history yet.Can move between 5% and 50% of those earnings.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: prelev_base_permille
  • Auto-repayment relief per level
    How much that automatic skim eases with each level of history, leaving a proven borrower more of their earnings.Can move between 0% and 20% less per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: prelev_discount_dpermille
  • Auto-repayment ceiling
    A hard cap on how much of your per-block community earnings automatic repayment can ever take, so it can never swallow all of them.Today 60% · can move between 60% and 80%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: collection_cap_permille
  • Borrowing envelope
    Caps a single loan at this multiple of one borrower's fair share of the available lending room, so no one borrower can draw the whole pool dry.Today ×2.0 · can move between ×0.5 and ×5.0.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: c01_beta_permille
  • Wait between loans
    The minimum wait before the same borrower can finish one loan and take another.Can move between none and about 30 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: credit_cooldown_blocks
  • Active-loan ceiling
    A cap on how many ordinary loans can be running at once across the whole network — raised in step with the clearing rate below.Today 10,000 · can move between 5,000 and 80,000.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: max_active_loans
  • Expired-loan clearing rate
    How many overdue loans the network closes out each block, bounding how long a backlog of defaults takes to clear.Today 50 per block · can move between 50 and 2,000.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: expired_loans_per_block
  • Hardship extensions
    How many times a struggling borrower can extend the term, with interest frozen during each, before the loan finally defaults and seizes the pledged security.Today 2 · can move between 0 and 6 (0 means default the moment a payment is overdue).Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: max_loan_extensions
B · The safety fund

The safety fund behind every loan.

The shared cushion that absorbs unpaid loans, so one default does not land on everyone. These dials set how large the cushion aims to be, how fast it refills from the treasury, when lending pauses to protect it, and how a wave of defaults tightens credit until the fund heals.

  • Safety-fund pause line
    How low the safety fund can fall, relative to the loans it covers, before new lending pauses to protect it.Can move between 5% and 50%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: guarantee_pause_threshold_permille
  • Safety-fund refill rate
    How fast the treasury tops the safety fund back up each block once it has been drawn down.Can move between 1% and 20% per step.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: guarantee_refill_rate_permille
  • Lending pause length
    How long new lending stays paused once the safety fund crosses its pause line.Can move between about 1 hour and about 1 day.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: guarantee_pause_blocks
  • Surplus-burn line
    When the safety fund grows past this multiple of the loans it covers, the excess is destroyed rather than left to pile up.Today 2× the active loans · can move between 1× and 10×.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: guarantee_burn_multiple
  • Safety-fund target
    The baseline share of outstanding loans the safety fund aims to hold — the community's call on how conservative the cushion should be.Today 15% · can move between 5% and 30%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: eps_k0_permille
  • Risk premium
    How much extra cushion the fund aims to hold for each point of the default rate averaged over recent months, so the buffer thickens when defaults rise.A multiplier, set between 0 and 10 (today around 3).Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: eps_k1
  • Refill speed
    The fraction of any shortfall in the safety fund refilled from the treasury each block, set so it recovers without overshooting.Today 50% · can move between 10% and 100%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: eps_alpha_permille
  • Loss memory
    How many months of losses the default rate is averaged over before it drives the fund's target, so one bad week does not swing the whole cushion.Today about 36 rounds · can move between 4 and 52.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: eps_ema_window
  • Borrower levy cap
    The most of a borrower's mining reward that can be redirected to refill the safety fund while it is short.Today 15% · can move between 5% and 30%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: eps_levy_cap_permille
  • Stress collateral slope
    How sharply the security required from new borrowers rises while the safety fund is short, cooling fresh credit in a stress.Today about half of the shortfall · can move between 0% and 100%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: vault_beta_permille
  • Stress collateral ceiling
    A cap on how much extra security a shortfall can ever demand, so a stress can never make borrowing impossible.Today up to +50% · can move between 0% and +75%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: vault_cap_permille
  • Deficit routing slope
    How far loan interest is shifted away from miners and toward the safety fund and treasury while the fund is short, then shifted back as it heals.A routing dial, set between 0 and 500 (today around 400).Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: routing_slope_permille
  • Miner interest floor
    The smallest share of loan interest miners always keep, even when the safety fund is fully short.Today 20% · can move between 20% and 40%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: routing_floor_miners_permille
  • Safety-fund interest share
    The share of loan interest routed into the safety fund when it is fully short, a self-healing loop that never drops below a fifth.Today 35% · can move between 20% and 50%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: routing_split_guar_permille
C · Defending against a run

Slowing a panic so it cannot drain the system.

When a currency starts to fail, people rush the exit all at once, and a rush can empty a system in hours. These dials put a brake on leaving — a tax on converting everyday money back to the reserve, rising as more people run — capped so it can never become a wall that confiscates the savings of people simply trying to get out.

  • Exit-tax ceiling
    The most that converting your everyday money back to the reserve asset can ever be taxed during a run — set low on purpose, so the brake can never seize someone's savings.Today 5% · can move between 5% and 10%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: exit_tax_cap_permille
  • Exit-tax responsiveness
    How fast that tax climbs as more people rush the exit at once, so a run slows its own exit instead of draining everything.A responsiveness dial, set between 200 and 2,000 (today around 1,000).Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: exit_tax_slope
  • Reserve-indexed capacity (dormant)
    A lever that would tie extra lending room to the reserve floor. It is inert today and changes nothing in practice, because the reserve floor sits far below the level that would trigger it.A scaling dial, set between 10 and 200 — a negligible fraction either way.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: k_res_ppm
  • ES to EGL conversion tax
    The small standing tax on converting everyday money back into the reserve asset, outside of a run.Can move between 0% and 5%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: es_to_egl_tax_permille
D · Your savings

Your savings, and what they earn.

The dials for locking up ES as savings: the share of real network activity savers receive, a cap so one large holder cannot take most of it, the smallest amount you can save, the wait before a withdrawal is released, and the rules that stop someone borrowing cheaply just to earn yield on the very same money.

  • Saver yield share
    The share of the treasury redistributed to savers each round — income that exists only if the network is genuinely used, and is worth nothing otherwise.Today 70% · can move between 0% and 90%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_yield_permille
  • Yield cap per saver
    The most savings any one person can have count toward yield, so one large holder cannot take most of the shared income.Today 15,000 ES · can move between 1,000 ES and 100,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_cap_es
  • No-decay comfort line
    The coverage level above which savers' yield is paid in full, below which it starts to fade.Today 50% · can move between 10% and 80%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_comfort_ratio
  • Yield decay steepness
    How quickly savers' yield fades once coverage drops below the comfort line.A steepness dial, set between 10,000 and 200,000 (today around 50,000).Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_decay_sensitivity
  • Minimum to save
    The smallest amount you can lock up as savings.Today 100 ES · can move between 10 ES and 10,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_min_amount
  • Overflow-to-savers line
    The safety-fund health level above which its overflow spills over to savers instead of piling up.Today 30% of active loans · can move between 10% and 80%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_overflow_threshold
  • Overflow-to-savers share
    How much of the safety fund's overflow is passed to savers each round once it is healthy enough to spare it.Today 10% · can move between 0% and 50%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_overflow_permille
  • Fee split to savers
    The share of the fee on each ES transfer that goes to savers; the rest reinforces the safety fund.Today 50% · can move between 0% and 80%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_fee_split
  • Savings release wait
    How long after you ask to withdraw before your savings are released — a notice period that stops a few from draining the cushion at the first scare.Today about 30 days · can move between none and about 90 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: unstake_cooldown
  • Yield credit floor
    The repayment-history level below which savings earn no yield at all — which blocks borrowing cheaply just to earn yield on the same money.Today level 7 · can move between 3 and 15.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: malus_score_floor
  • Same-money borrowing spread floor
    A minimum interest spread that further discourages borrowing cheaply just to earn yield on the same money. It is a backstop, inert today, with the yield credit floor above doing the main work.Today 0.1% · can move between 0% and 5%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_floor_spread_permille
E · Who may vote, how fast you act

Who may vote, and the pace of acting.

The dials that set the bar a saver clears to earn a vote on the rules, the guardrail against one person faking many identities, and the short waits that keep any single account from flooding the system. The voting bar is two settings working as one rule, explained as a single line below — never as two fixed numbers.

  • The voting-stake bar
    How much you must lock up in savings to earn a vote on the rules. It is set by two dials working as one rule: the live bar is whichever is larger — a fixed floor, or a multiple of the typical saver's stake. Tying it to the typical stake keeps the bar fair as the network grows, instead of frozen at one number.The floor can move between 15,000 ES and 500,000 ES; the multiple between 1.0× and 3.0× the typical stake (today 2.0×).Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: staking_gov_threshold (floor) + staking_gov_threshold_k_permille (multiple)
  • Action cooldown
    The minimum wait between two governance or credit actions from the same account, so no one can flood the system.Today about 12 hours · can move between none and about 30 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: miner_action_cooldown_blocks
  • Orgs one person can vouch for
    How many distinct organisations a single human can vouch for, a guardrail against one person faking many endorsements.Today 10 · can move between 1 and 1,000.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: max_org_validations_per_human
F · Fairness in the rewards

Keeping the shared rewards fair.

The dials that keep block rewards spread fairly: the cap that stops the biggest farm from taking too large a slice of the shared pot, and the bonus that rewards broad participation over a lucky few.

  • Anti-whale dividend cap
    The most of the shared dividend any one miner can take, so the largest farm cannot scoop up much more than someone mining a few hours a day.Today 25% · can move between 5% and 90%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: dividend_cap_permille
  • Equal-distribution bonus
    A bonus that grows the more people take part, tilting the shared dividend toward broad participation rather than a lucky few.Can move between 0% and 50%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: dividend_bonus_permille
  • Bonus progressivity
    How steeply that equalizing bonus scales with participation.A scaling dial, set between 1 and 1,000.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: dividend_bonus_scale
G · The money supply and fees

The money itself, and everyday fees.

The dials on the money supply and the small costs of using it: how fast new EGL issuance fades each year, the small fee on an ES transfer, how much of a fee is destroyed rather than redistributed, and how many miners a pool holds before it splits in two.

  • Emission decay rate
    How fast the creation of new EGL fades each year, on a gentle slope with no brutal cliff.Today about 5% a year · can move between 0.1% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: emission_decay_rate_permille
  • ES transfer fee
    The small fee on sending ES; half reinforces the safety fund, half goes to savers — no operator pockets it.Can move between 0% and 5%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: es_transfer_fee_permille
  • Fee burn rate
    How much of a transaction fee is destroyed rather than redistributed, gently shrinking the money supply with use.Can move between 0% and 80%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fee_burn_permille
  • Pool size before split
    How many miners a pool can hold before it splits in two, keeping any one pool from growing too large.Can move between 50 and 5,000 miners.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: pool_max_miners
H · Lending between people

Lending between people, with neighbours vouching.

The dials for the path where someone who does not mine — a seamstress, a cooperative, a migrant — borrows with people who vouch for them. The size of a request, the interest corridor, how many borrowers one person can back, what happens after a missed loan, and an inactivity alert that can pause a loan whose borrower has gone silent.

  • Loans you can co-sponsor
    How many peer loans one person can vouch for at once, so a guarantor can spread their risk rather than stake everything on one.Today 3 · can move between 1 and 10.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_max_sponsors_per_miner
  • Smallest peer request
    The smallest amount someone can ask for in a peer loan.Today 100 ES · can move between 10 ES and 1,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_min_request_es
  • Largest peer request
    The largest amount someone can ask for in a peer loan.Today 50,000 ES · can move between 100 ES and 500,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_max_request_es
  • Repayment window
    The longest a borrower has to repay a peer loan.Today about 2 years · can move between about 1 month and about 4 years.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_repayment_max_epochs
  • Sponsors to cut funding
    How many of the borrower's guarantors must agree to trigger an emergency stop on the funding of a peer loan.Today 3 of 6 guarantors · can move between 2 and 5.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_cut_threshold_count
  • Wait after default
    How long a borrower who defaulted on a peer loan must wait before asking for another.Today about 90 days · can move between about 3 days and about 1 year.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_default_cooldown
  • Sponsor funding rate
    The share of each guarantor's earnings the protocol skims each block to fund a borrower they vouched for, so solidarity is automatic.Today 5% · can move between 1% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_sponsor_prelev_permille
  • Peer-loan rate floor
    The lowest interest a peer loan can carry, a floor that stops borrowing cheaply just to earn yield on the same money.Today 6% · can move between 0% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_interest_floor_permille
  • Peer-loan rate ceiling
    The highest interest a peer loan can be offered at, so the corridor stays neither usurious nor a giveaway.Today 25% · can move between 15% and 25%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_max_rate_dpermille
  • Endorsement bonus cap
    The most a peer loan can be topped up when the community endorses it, as a share of the amount.Today 10% · can move between 0% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_endorsement_bonus_cap
  • Votes per bonus point
    How many community upvotes it takes to add one percent of endorsement bonus to a peer loan.Today 100 votes per 1% · can move between 10 and 1,000.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_endorsement_votes_per_pct
  • Donation bonus divisor
    A dial setting how generously a donation toward a peer loan is matched — a smaller number means a larger match.Today 5 · can move between 1 and 20.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_donation_bonus_divisor
  • Peer-loan silence before alert
    How long a borrower in a peer loan can go silent before an inactivity alert is raised — an alert that can pause a stalled loan.Today about 30 days · can move between about 3 days and about 90 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_terminal_alert_blocks
  • Peer-loan silence before auto-cut
    How long a borrower's silence can build up before a stalled peer loan is cut automatically — always longer than the alert above.Today about 60 days · can move between about 6 days and about 180 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: p2p_terminal_cut_blocks
I · The humanitarian fund

The humanitarian fund — the 5% at work.

The dials for the 5% of every block that funds the common good: how long a project stays open, how the shared pool tops up gifts — matching that counts how many people give, not how much each one gives — the small share the organizer keeps for doing the work, and how many verified people must vouch for a project before it can receive a cent. The 5% share itself is out of every vote's reach; these are the dials around how it is spent.

  • Creator fee
    The share of what a project raises that the person who opened it keeps for doing the work of bringing people together — taken from contributions, never from the matched funds.Today 5% · can move between 0% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_creator_fee_permille
  • How long a project stays open
    How long a humanitarian project stays open to receive contributions.Today about 30 days · can move between about 3 days and about 90 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_open_duration_blocks
  • Matching rate
    How much the shared pool tops up a project — matching that counts how many people give, not how much each one gives, so many small givers trigger a far larger match than one big donor.Today 5% · can move between 0% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_matching_rate_permille
  • Repayment-to-pool share
    The share of automatic loan repayments funnelled into the humanitarian matching pool, so everyday credit feeds the common good.Today 7.5% · can move between 0% and 20%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_conversion_rate_permille
  • Fund crediting rate
    The rate at which reserve asset converts to everyday money when crediting the humanitarian fund.Today 1 EGL credits 100 ES · can move between 1 and 1,000 ES per EGL.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_egl_to_es_rate
  • Funds release timelock
    A wait before the money raised by a project is released to its organizer, leaving time to contest a fraud.Today about 3 days · can move between about half a day and about 30 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_escrow_duration_blocks
  • Open projects per creator
    How many projects one organizer can keep open at the same time, a guardrail against spam.Today 3 · can move between 1 and 20.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_max_projects_per_creator
  • Validators to fund a project
    How many verified people, from at least two countries, must vouch for a project before it can receive matched funds — the one thing a fraudster cannot self-supply.Today 50 · can move between 30 and 100.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_project_validation_threshold
  • Per-person contribution cap
    The most one person's gifts to a single project can count toward the shared match, so one large donor cannot capture the pool; anything above stays in your balance.Today 1,000 ES · can move between 100 ES and 1,000,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: fund_max_contribution_per_project_es
  • Witnesses per enrolment
    How many community vouchers can stand behind one person's enrolment, a cap that resists capture.Today 10 · can move between 1 and 50.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: community_witness_cap
  • Witness bond (optional)
    An optional amount a community voucher can stake; on a confirmed fraud it is split between the person who exposed it and the honest vouchers.Today none required · can move between 0 ES and 1,000,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: community_witness_bond_es
J · Letting institutions in

Letting institutions in — a separate mechanism.

The dials for the separate institutional path: banks, cooperatives, and licensed bridges that join with real machines and settle large amounts under a verified business identity. They touch your everyday money in one way only — by routing an amplified share of their fees back to the community pools. The settlement itself is guarded by a different keyset — three of five regulators, not the governance co-signers — and is not the subject of this page. But these dials, like all the rest, are still voted by miners.

  • Entity yield cap
    The most an institutional miner can earn in yield; any surplus is redistributed to ordinary miners.Today 55% · can move between 20% and 80%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_yield_permille
  • Machines per entity
    How many machines one institution can link under a single verified identity.Today 10,000 · can move between 100 and 100,000.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_max_machines
  • Entity collateral baseline
    The security an institution must pledge against a loan before any history lowers it — set a little under the retail level because the entity carries on-chain liability.Today 30% · can move between 10% and 50%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_vault_base
  • Entity collateral relief
    How much an institution's required security drops per level of history, down to none for a proven one.Can move between 0.5% and 3% off per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_vault_discount
  • Entity base rate
    The starting interest on an institution's loan, before history lowers it.Today 7.5% · can move between 2% and 15%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_interest_base
  • Entity rate floor
    The lowest interest an institution's loan can fall to, matching the retail floor.Today 2% · can move between 0% and 5%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_interest_floor
  • Entity borrowing power, baseline
    How much an institution can borrow as a multiple of its standing, before it has built history.Today 0.5× · can move between 0.1× and 1.0×.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_loan_mult_base
  • Entity borrowing power growth
    How fast an institution's borrowing room grows with each level of history.A growth dial, set between 0.5 and 5.0 per level.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_loan_mult_slope
  • Entity loan duration
    How long an institution's loan runs — longer than a retail loan, to fit institutional cash flow.Today about 60 days · can move between about 30 days and about 120 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_loan_duration
  • Hashrate warning line
    The point at which an institution is flagged for declaring more computing power than it actually delivers.Today flagged above 130% of measured · can move between 110% and 150%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_hashrate_warn
  • Hashrate suspend line
    The point at which an institution overstating its computing power is suspended outright.Today suspended at 150% of measured · can move between 130% and 200%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_hashrate_suspend
  • Entity demand-rate discount
    How much of the demand-driven interest rise an institution is spared.Today 50% · can move between 20% and 80%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: entity_dynamic_discount
  • Business attestation freshness
    How old an institution's business-identity verification can be before it must be renewed.Today 18 months · can move between 1 year and 3 years.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: kyb_attestation_max_age_months
  • Bridge collateral floor
    The least an institution must lock up as collateral to register as a licensed settlement bridge.Today 1,000,000 ES · can move between 100,000 ES and 5,000,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: bridge_min_collateral_es
  • Bridge collateral lock
    How long a bridge's collateral stays locked, to prevent a sudden exit.Today about 1 year · can move between about 30 days and about 10 years.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: bridge_collateral_lock_blocks
  • Attestation freshness
    How old a bridge's proof of what it holds can be before the network suspends it on its own.Today about 7 days · can move between about 1 day and about 1 year.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: bridge_attestation_max_age
  • Settlement fee
    The fee charged on the net amount settled between two bridges, not on the gross flow.Today 0.5% · can move between 0% and 5%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: settle_fee_permille
  • Minimum settlement batch
    The smallest net amount a settlement can carry, a guardrail against spam.Today 1,000 ES · can move between 1 ES and 100,000 ES.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: settle_min_batch_size_es
  • Batches per block
    How many settlements the network processes per block.Today 50 · can move between 1 and 500.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: settle_max_batch_per_block
  • Slash to counterparty
    When a bridge cheats and its collateral is seized, the share handed to the bridge it wronged; the rest goes to the humanitarian match and is partly destroyed.Today 50% to the counterparty · can move between 0% and 100%.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: bridge_slash_to_counterparty
  • Institutional-fee multiplier
    How much an institution's settlement fees are amplified when routed back to the community pools, so citizens benefit from institutional activity.Today ten times · can move between one time and a hundred times.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: isu_fee_to_es_rate
  • Settlement-unit mint cooldown
    The minimum wait between two issues of the institutional settlement unit (fiat-backed, used only between licensed institutions) by the same bridge.Today about 100 minutes · can move between none and about 30 days.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: isu_mint_cooldown_blocks
  • Minimum settlement-unit issue
    The smallest amount of the institutional settlement unit a bridge can issue at once, an institutional-lot floor against spam.Today 1,000,000 units · can move between 1,000 and 5,000,000.Voted by every verified miner and savers above the voting bar.in the code: isu_min_mint_amount

A few slots are held empty for a future evolution and cannot be changed yet.

WHERE THIS STANDS

Honestly, where this stands.

  • Out of reachThe 10% shared dividend and the 5% humanitarian share. No majority, on any path, reaches them.
  • NetworkThe test network. Everything described here runs and verifies on it, with no real value yet. The public network opens when the protocol is ready.
  • Passport identityBuilt and tested, but dormant. Until it is live, perfectly clean one-person-one-vote is not yet guaranteed; the test network runs on a stripped-down version.
  • The two keysetsThe governance co-signers are two of three independent keyholders, and all three for a deepest-rule change. A separate three-of-five regulator keyset guards settlement with outside institutions — a different mechanism, not these votes.
To be exact"It cannot be changed" is exact for the vote, not absolute. No vote on this page reaches the deepest rules, and nothing here can move in silence — that is what I can promise. The one thing that could still move them is a coordinated, open upgrade of the whole network: a visible and costly public departure that everyone would see. You can read the live network for yourself at testnet.egalchain.xyz.
YOUR PART

Your part.

The rules hold because the people who use the money read the rules and weigh a change with the others before pushing it — not because anyone above them is trusted to get it right. That is the whole of it. There is no board to defer to.

You do not have to follow every setting yourself. If you would rather not track a hundred dials, you can entrust your vote to someone you trust, and take it back whenever you want. Following everything is not the price of having a voice.

Today, on the test network, you can already do all of it — propose a change, vote on one, run a poll to ask the others, file a witness to set down your case. With no real value yet, so you can learn how it works without risking anything.

At launch, the same gestures carry real weight — and the verified passport makes each voice exactly one person's. The dials you move then move real money, for real people.

These are the rules of your money. You are one of the hands on them now. The dial you move sits on someone's loan, someone's savings — so weigh it the way the borrower or the saver would, because they are the ones who pay if you get it wrong.

Open the application